Recklessness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard after Hochfelder by Bolger, Jeanne P.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 49 Issue 5 Article 7 
1980 
Recklessness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard after 
Hochfelder 
Jeanne P. Bolger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeanne P. Bolger, Recklessness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard after Hochfelder , 49 Fordham L. 
Rev. 817 (1981). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol49/iss5/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
RECKLESSNESS AND THE RULE 10b-5 SCIENTER STANDARD
AFTER HOCHFELDER
INTRODUCTION
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, I the Supreme Court held that to maintain
a private damage action based on a violation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's rule lOb-5, 2 the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted
with scienter. The Court thereby excluded liability for "negligent conduct
alone,"'3 defining scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
1. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Hochfelder followed a long period of expansion of the scope of
securities legislation. In recognition of the need to construe the securities laws broadly and
flexibly, the Court expanded the concept of fraud under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §
206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U S. 180, 195
(1963), recognized a private right of action for violations of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1976) (1934 Act), J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964),
and liberalized the causation requirement for material misstatements or omissions in proxy
statements, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970). The expansion of the
private damage action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), however, was
perhaps the most significant in that time period. The Court extended the protections of § 10(b) to
corporations, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-14 (1971),
determined that no securities exchange or organized over-the-counter market need be involved to
make a transaction actionable, id., recognized an implied private right to damages. Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 156-57 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971), and ruled that in a case of nondisclosure, "positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S, 128,
153 (1972). These Supreme Court decisions, together with the lower federal courts' interpretations
of them, expanded the scope of the securities laws to such an extent that commentators have
described the expansion as a "revolution in securities regulation." Whitaker & Rotch, The
Supreme Court And The Counter-Revolution In Securities Regulation, 30 Ala. L. Rev. 335, 336
(1979). It has been commented that "[tihe continued expansion of rule lob-5, under the rationale
of promoting its intended remedial purpose, has been greeted with a rending of garments and a
gnashing of teeth by the brokerage industry. Promised elucidation of rule 10b-5. . . has not been
forthcoming." Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals And Rule 10b-5: Legal Standards,
Industry Practices, Preventative Guidelines And Proposals For Reform, 43 Fordhan L. Rev.
505, 505 (1975) (footnote omitted).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under § 10b) of the 1934 Act which
provides that it is unlawful "tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Throughout this Note, "rule 10b-S" will be
used to refer to either the rule or to § 10(b).
3. 425 U.S. at 201. The Court expressed a desire to exclude "wholly faultless" conduct from
the scope of rule 10b-5, id. at 198, and conduct which is the product of an "entirely innocent
mistake." Id. at 207. The Court noted: "As we find the language and history of § 10(b) dispositive
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
manipulate, or defraud."'4 Although the Court noted that "[i]n certain areas of
the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct,"5 it
declined both to define recklessness and to state whether it satisfies the
scienter requirement. 6 The federal Courts of Appeal now generally agree that
of the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine the additional considera-
tions of 'policy.'..." Id. at 214 n.33. The Court, however, went on to discuss the ramifications of
a negligence standard on securities professionals. "Acceptance of [a negligence standard] would
extend to new frontiers the 'hazards' of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious
policy questions not yet addressed by Congress." Id. See also 5 A. Jacobs, The Impact of
Rule 10b-5 (rev. ed. 1979). The author reported that eight policies underly rule 10b-5: "(I)
maintaining free securities markets; (2) equalizing access to information; (3) insuring equal
bargaining strength; (4) providing for disclosure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring fairness; (7)
building investor confidence; and (8) deterring violations while compensating victims." Id. § 6.01,
at 1-125. For a discussion of the crucial role of securities professionals such as accountants,
lawyers, and broker-dealers in maintaining the efficient functioning of the securities market, see
3A H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law §§ 7.06, 9.09 (rev. ed. 1979);
Metzger & Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications fir the Auditor, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 79
(1978). While it has been recognized that "many large securities transactions require the
mechanical aid of a number of [securities professionals]," Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. E. F. Hutton
& Co., 457 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), it has also been asserted that "[iun our
complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for
inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar." United States v. Benjamin,
328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); accord, SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 950 (1979); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1976); Messer, Roles and Reasonable Expectations of the Underwriter, Lawyer and Indepen-
dent Securities Auditor in the Efficient Provision of Verified Information: 'Truth in Securities'
Reinforced, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 429 (1973); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120
U. Pa. L. Rev. 597 (1972); Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial
Statements, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1437 (1967); Note, Recklessness Under Section 10(b): Weathering
the Hochfelder Storm., 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 325 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Weathering the
Hochfelder Storm]; Note, Rule lob-5: Liability for Aiding and Abetting after Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 28 U. Fla. L. Rev. 999 (1976).
4. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
5. Id.
6. Id. The Court stated: "We need not address here the question whether, in some circum-
stances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5." Id. The
Court also reserved the question whether scienter was a necessary element in an injunctive suit
brought under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, by either the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
or a private individual. Id. This article deals only with scienter in private damage actions. The
courts that have dealt with the issue of scienter in injunctive suits, however, have reached varied
results. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1978) (knowing or intentional
conduct is necessary); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978) (assumed negligence is sufficient); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8,
18-19 (2d Cir. 1977) (negligence is sufficient); SEC v. Everest Mgt. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167,
175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (required knowingly willful conduct). See generally Whitaker & Rotch,
supra note 1, at 372-73 (1979); Calhoun, Divining the Implications of Ernst & Ernst v
Hochfelder, 1 Corp. L. Rev. 99, 102-07 (1978); 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1018, 1024-28 (1977); 22 Vill. L.
Rev. 1238, 1247-53 (1977); see also Comment, Scienter and SEC Injunctive Actions Under
Securities Act Section 17(a), 63 Iowa L. Rev. 1248 (1978). The Supreme Court will soon decide
whether the SEC is required to establish scienter in enforcement actions to enjoin violations of
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recklessness suffices as a form of scienter to support rule lob-5 liability.7 The
courts, however, have neither adopted nor applied a uniform definition of
recklessness. 8
Most of the uncertainty in defining recklessness as a form of scienter under
rule 10b-5 stems from the ambiguity of the Hoclifelder decision. 9 Although the
§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct 227
(1979).
7. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979h Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC,
591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 list Cir.
1978); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1336-37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.& 970 (1978);
Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (Ist Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.. 570
F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v Benson, 559
F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978). Bosser v. Magazine. 11978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ( 96,304. at 93.022 (D.C Cir 1977). Coleco Indus.,
Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U . 830 (1978)' Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033. 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U S. 875 (1977).
The Fourth Circuit has not decided the issue. The Eighth Circuit has failed to define the
Hochfelder scienter requirement. Shull v. Dan. Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152. 156 (Sth
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). In Berdahl v. SEC. 572 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1978),
however, the Eighth Circuit accepted a recklessness standard in an SEC enforcement action
citing cases in the other circuits that have adopted recklessness in private damage actions- id at
647 n.6.
8. E.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir) fiduciary duty
standard), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem Corp., 553 F 2d
1033 (7th Cir.) (must have known), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); White v. Abrams. 495 F.2d
724 (9th Cir. 1974) (flexible duty standard); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp.. 429 F Supp.
818 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (should have known); see Bucklo. The Supreme Court Attempts to
Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 29 Stan. L. Rev- 213. 233-35
(1977); Jacobs, Rule 10b-5 Developments-Who Can Sue and Who Is Liable, in Tenth Ann Inst.
on Sec. Reg. 457, 466-69 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Stevenson, eds. 1979). The Court's
definition of scienter added little to the "glib generalizations and unthinking abstractions" already
characteristic of securities jurisprudence. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969);
see Goldwasser, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: An Anti-Landinark Decision, 22 N Y L.S. L_ Rev-
29, 40-62 (1976); 2 J. Corp. Law. 389, 403-04 (1977); notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text.
9. Although the Hoclhfelder Court stated that the scienter requirement was "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud," 425 U.S. at 193 n. 12, its analysis contained various other formulations.
For example, the Court found that the language of the statute "was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional misconduct." Id. at 197. Similarly, the Court interpreted the statute "to
proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence." Id. at 199 (footnote omitted)
Finally, the Court stated that "the language of § 10(b) . clearly connotes intentional
misconduct." Id. at 201. "The phrase 'mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud' has frequently been quoted, but few courts have attempted the difficult task of applying
the standard to the specific facts before them. Those courts that have attempted to reconcile an
expansive interpretation of the scienter standard . . . have often done so in spite of the Court's
language, rather than because of it." Note, The Supreme Court's Trimming tcf the Section JOtb
Tree: The Cultivation of a New Securities Lou Perspective, 3 J. Corp. Law 112. 115 1977)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Trimning of the Section iO1b) Tree], Furthermore. the
legislative history of § 10(b) does little to clarify the elements of a private cause of action, because
the federal courts implied the action from § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 using a statutory tort theory
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). see Superintendent of Ins. v
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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Court held that negligence is not actionable, it did not decide whether proof
that defendants acted with any form of scienter more culpable than "innocent
mistake" will suffice.10 Yet, because the Court also stated that proof of
"intentional or willful conduct" is required for liability, ''it implied that a
form of mental culpability approaching purpose or intent is necessary to
sustain a cause of action under rule lob-5.' 2
In an attempt to resolve the ambiguities of Hochfelder, two different
definitions of recklessness have been developed by the federal courts. Certain
courts have defined a reckless defendant as one who "should have known" that his
conduct was fraudulent.13 Others have stated that a reckless defendant is one
who "must have known" of the risk of harm to plaintiffs that would result
from his conduct. 14 Although the distinction may appear purely semantic, it is
submitted that the first definition of recklessness is indistinguishable from
negligence, which Hochfelder rejected as a standard for rule lob-5 liability.
The latter definition, however, is equivalent to the form of willful or con-
scious deception required by Hochfelder, and has recently been adopted and
correctly applied by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp. 's
The Seventh Circuit definition of recklessness properly restricts liability
under rule 10b-5 to conduct performed with an element of mental culpabil-
10. 425 U.S. at 207; see Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 5,17 F.2d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 1976), cerl.
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st Cir.
1976); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
11. 425 U.S. at 199.
12. See Liggio, The 'Ernst' Ruling-Expansion of a Trend, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 14, 1976, at 1,
col. 2 (Part I); Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree, supra note 9, at 116. It has been argued that a
strict scienter standard is necessary to limit the scope of rule lob-5 liability. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976). The concern expressed in Hochfelder is based on
policy considerations present at common law. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931), the New York Court of Appeals excluded negligence as the basis for an action
against accountants for fraudulent misrepresentation. Judge Cardozo noted that to allow accoun-
tants' liability to be based on negligence would "expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Id. at 179, 174 N.E.
at 444. Thus, the court concluded that "if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor
insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for negligence is
one that is bounded by the contract." Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448; see Solomon, Ultramares
Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability To The Public, 18 De Paul L. Rev. 56
(1968); Note, Accountants' Liability For Negligence-A Contemporary Approach For A Modern
Profession, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (1979).
13. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Stern v. American
Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 826 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The validity of such an interpreta-
tion is to be seriously questioned because "the Supreme Court [in Hochfelderl reversled] the [lower
court's] decision, which was premised on a 'should have known' or simple negligence standard." 9
Creighton L. Rev. 775. 792-93 (1976) (footnote omitted); see notes 114-23 infra and accompanying
text.
14. E.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d
790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977); see notes 71-90 infra and accompanying text.
15. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 375 (1977); see notes 79-93 itora and
accompanying text.
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ity. 16 Furthermore, it provides an objective standard that may be satisfied by
circumstantial evidence that the risk of fraudulently misleading the plaintiff
was obvious to the defendant. Most important, the definition comports with
the congressional intent and the Hochfelder decision. 7  Accordingly,
16. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.31 (1976) The legislative history of
the 1934 Act evidences a congressional intent to exclude from liability conduct which is useful to
the market system, but is negligently performed. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess 7, 12
(1934). The reason for this concern is that non-culpable conduct such as negligence cannot be
specifically deterred. The fear of potential liability, however, could deter professionals from
undertaking the performance of their functions which would have a deleterious effect on the
market as a whole. See 425 U.S. at 211 n.31; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 747-48 (1975). In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.. 401 F 2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). tert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), Judge Friendly argued in a concurring opinion that recklessness
"equivalent to willful fraud," id. at 868 (Friendly, J., concurring), should be the scienter
standard in rule 10b-5 actions to reduce the potential for the unduly "expansive liability" inherent
in a negligence standard. Id. Judge Friendly stated, "[tihe consequences of holding that
negligence in the drafting of a press release . . . may impose civil liability . .. are frightening."
Id. at 866. He also noted that inordinate liability would deter the future disclosure of information
to the general public by forcing corporations to choose between remaining silent, or to is-ue
releases "at the risk that a slip of the pen or failure properly to amass or weigh the facts [would]
lead to large judgments." Id. at 867. See also Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv.
L. Rev. 1340, 1370 (1966). Although the scienter standard may not include negligence, it need not
be limited to a strict intent to defraud. E.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir.
1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (6th Cir 1979); Cook v
Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,
45-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790,
792-93 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043-45 (7th Cir 1,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); see Bucklo, supra note 8, at 227-40; Weathering the Hoch/elder
Storm, supra note 3, at 343-45. The support for limiting scienter to a strict intent to defraud is
based on a narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court cases that were decided in the same
period as Hochifelder, that limit the scope of the securitie!s laws. E.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975). These cases, however, emphasize the equitable balance between investor protection
and the facilitation of the role of the professional and the ethical businessman. See, e.g., TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976) ("The potential liability for a Rule 14a-9
violation can be great indeed, and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low . . . the
corporation and its management [may] be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or
misstatements .... ); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975) ("Indeed, the
Act's draftsmen commented upon the 'extreme care' which was taken 'to avoid tipping the
balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover
bid.' "); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975) V'The very pendency of
the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity. ). The strict intent to defraud
standard does not strike an equitable balance because it overly limits the private cause of action
in derogation of the legislative intent to interpret the laws broadly and flexibly. See United States
v. Naftalin, 99 S. Ct. 2077, 2082-83 (1979); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 194-95 (1963).
17. The Hochfelder Court examined the words of § 10(b) and concluded that they proscribed
conduct of a "knowing" or "intentional" nature. 425 U.S. at 197. Moreover, the legislative reports
indicate that the word "manipulative" was not meant to encompass only intentional acts. The
statutory words "manipulative," "deceptive," and "contrivance," necessitate proof that the
defendant had either actual or constructive knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding
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"[b]ecause securities litigation can be complex and expensive," and "should be
avoided to the maximum extent by early clarification of the ground rules, '"'8
this Note contends that the courts should resolve the existing uncertainty as to
the proper scienter standard after Hochfelder by adopting and appropriately
applying the Seventh Circuit's definition of recklessness. 19
I. RECKLESSNESS AT COMMON LAW
In general, the purpose of requiring some form of scienter as an element of
a cause of action is to limit the scope of liability and to guide the application
of sanctions. 20 These concerns are present, for example, in common law
accountants' liability for fraud,2 1 defamation of public officials, 22 and in
criminal law manslaughter cases. 23 In these contexts, courts have been
the allegedly fraudulent securities transactions. See 425 U.S. at 199-201. For example, in
describing the manipulative practices that were specifically envisioned to be covered by the
securities laws, Senator Fletcher reported the following occurrence: "[TIestimony before the
committee has shown that a broker, while operating a syndicate account in a copper stock,
caused the sale of 35,000 shares by the syndicate and the purchase of 35,000 shares by an
individual member of the syndicate on the same day. Although any intention to accomplish a
'wash' sale was disclaimed, nevertheless the result of the transaction was to bring about an
immediate rise in the market value of the stock . . . ." S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1934). This scenario indicates that Congress envisioned that professedly unintentional actions
would be covered by the sections prohibiting manipulations, such as § 10(b). Specifically, this
report illustrates that a conscious decision to disregard the risk can be imputed to the broker, in
light of the obvious circumstances surrounding the transaction. See 3 A. Bromberg & L.
Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 8., (1977) (advocating a constructive
knowledge standard).
18. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 434 U.S. 911, 912 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). The disputed issue In
Dupuy was the correct standard of care for plaintiffs in 10b-5 private damage actions. See
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Note,
The Due Diligence Defense in Rule lOb-5: The Hochfelder Aftershocks, 11 Ind. L. Rev. 727
(1978); Note, Plaintiffs Standard of Care After Hochfelder: Toward A Theory of Causation, 31
Vand. L. Rev. 1225 (1978); 9 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 598 (1978).
19. The scienter issue has become a deciding factor in many cases not only due to the
Hochfelder decision, but because the materiality and reliance elements of the private damage
action under rule lob-5 have become less debatable. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). "Tile
disappearance of privity and the relaxations of materiality, reliance and causation leave scienter
as the principal 'swing' element in many cases." 3 A. Bromberg, supra note 17, § 8.4, at 514
(1977).
20. See generally I F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 7.3 (1956); W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts §§ 75, 76, 107, 128, at 492-94, 501, 700-04, 920-22 (4th ed. 1971);
Haimoff, Holnes Looks at Hochfelder and lOb-5, 32 Bus. Law. 147, 151-52 (1976).
21. See generally Keeton, Professional Malpractice, 17 Washburn L.J. 445 (1978); Note,
Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1437
(1967); Note, Accountants' Liability For Negligence-A Contemporary Approach For A Modern
Profession, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (1979).
22. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1349 (1975);
Wade, Defamation, the First Amendment and the Torts Restatement, 11 Forum 3 (1975).
23. See generally S. Kadish & M. Paulsen, Criminal Law & Its Processes 192-93 (3d ed.
1976); W. La Fave & A. Scott, Criminal Law §§ 73-78 (1972); Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of
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successful in drawing clear distinctions between various mental states, par-
ticularly in distinguishing recklessness from other forms of scienter. Thus,
although these areas of the law are not identical to securities law,24 "[it is
unquestionable that the common law has served as an interpretive source of
securities law concepts." 2 5
At common law, recklessness is viewed as occupying a place on a con-
tinuum of conduct: intentional conduct is at one extreme, negligence is at the
other, and in between, are knowing conduct and recklessness. 26 Each of these
forms of conduct differ in mental culpability according to the degree of
intentionality, risk, and resulting harm.
27
Recklessness and intentional conduct are comparatively easy to discern.
The intentional actor is substantially certain that harm will result from his
conduct, and acts specifically to cause that harm.28 In contrast, from the
vantage point of the reckless actor, it is strongly probable that harm will
result from his act, yet he acts in disregard of that risk. 29 Because of this
Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 294 (1954). The general principle of proportionality in criminal law
is that "liability ought to match culpability." H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice 436 (1979).
Once culpability is determined, greater or lesser punishment is administered -according to greater
or lesser culpability" and penalties are assigned "on a scale that reflects relative culpability among
crimes, both for different kinds of crimes and for different instances of the same kind of crime."
Id. at 438; see Mulligan, Cruel And Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47
Fordhan L. Rev. 639, 64548 (1979).
24. A review of the recklessness standard in torts and criminal law is instructive because their
underlying goals-compensation and deterrence--are similar to those underlying the securities
laws. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104-07 (10th Cir.I, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D Pa.
1946); Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. Law. 991,
1001 (1976); Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule 10b-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72
Mich. L. Rev. 1398, 1429 (1974); 1977 Utah L. Rev. 150, 152 n. 17.
25. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38. 45 (2d Cir 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1979); see Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1976). cert. denied,
430 U.S. 955 (1977); Nickels v. Koehler Mgt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir- 1976). The
elements of the common law action for fraud or deceit are: a misrepresentation of a material fact,
scienter of the defendant, an intent to induce reliance, the plaintiff's justifiable reliance and
subsequent injury. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977); W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 105,
at 685-86. The elements of the private damage action under rule 10b-5 closely parallel these
elements. 3 H. Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at 9-106 to 9-164; 4 A. Bromberg & L Lowenfels,
supra note 17, at 195-223. See generally 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1445-1473 (2d ed. 1961),
Note, Plaintiff's Standard of Care After Hochfeldcr: Towards A Theory of Causation, 31 Vand. L.
Rev. 1225, 1225 (1978).
26. E.g., Bucklo, supra note 8, at 214 n.8; accord, Trimming qf the Section Otb) Tree, supra
note 9, at 118-22. See generally Keeton. Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 583 (1965).
27. H. Gross, supra note 23, at 77-82.
28. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, Comment f at 590 (1977). see, e.g., United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1964); Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 713 (1926).
29. See Western Constr., Inc. v. Southern Pac. Co., 381 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1967); Ellis
v. Ferguson, 238 Ark. 776, 778-79, 385 S.W.2d 154, 155 (1964), Mathes v. Robinson, 205 Kan.
402, 406-07, 469 P.2d 259, 263 (1970); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1977).
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probability of harm, recklessness is usually viewed as a form of knowing
conduct. 30 The knowledge that is possessed by the reckless actor is imputed
from the objective circumstances of his conduct. 3I Actual knowledge, how-
ever, is "consciousness of the existence of a fact" that is proven by subjective
evidence.32 The difference between the two mental states may be expressed
as: "the reckless actor must have known" and "the knowing actor knew."
Although the manner of proof is different, courts have generally recognized
that the willfulness inhering in knowledgeable conduct is also present in
reckless conduct. 3 For example, in United States v. Benjamin,34 an accoun-
tant participated in a conspiracy to sell unregistered securities fraudulently by
preparing a pro forma financial statement without factual basis. 35 Spec-
ifically, the defendant failed to examine or inspect the issuing corporation's
accounts, and included assets which did not exist. 36 In determining whether
the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant had the requisite
degree of mental culpability, 37 the court noted the distinction between actual
and imputed knowledge and concluded that the willfulness involved is the
same. 38 The court stated that " 'while there is no allowable inference of
knowledge from the mere fact of falsity, there are many cases where from the
actor's special situation and continuity of conduct an inference that he did
30. See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1974); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). See also
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976)
("[K]nowingly in criminal statutes is not limited to positive knowledge, but includes the state of
mind of one who does not possess positive knowledge only because he consciously avoided it.")
(footnote omitted).
31. W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 107, at 701; accord, United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d
854, 861 (2d Cir. 1964); Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 713 (1926). An objective standard is an external standard that does not depend on the
psychological awareness of the individual. H. Gross, supra note 23 at 90-103; 0. Holmes, The
Common Law 39-76 (1881).
32. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 20, § 16.5, at 907-08 (footnote omitted). See generally
Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1927). Subjective intent
requires a "psychological elemen[t]" which requires that defqndants actually " 'have in their
minds' the elements of foresight" or knowledge. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility
Essays in the Philosophy of the Law 152 (1975). See generally W. La Fave & A. Scott, supra note
23, at 216.
33. See McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co.
v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1979); Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647 & n.6 (8th
Cir. 1978).
34. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
35. Id. at 859-60. The court characterized the scheme as "another of those sickening financial
frauds which so sadly memorialize the rapacity of the perpetrators and the gullibility, and
perhaps also the cupidity, of the victims." Id. at 856. The scheme involved selling shares of
worthless stock to innocent investors. Id. at 862.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 861-63. The case was brought under the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 17(a), 24, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77e (a, c), 77q(a), 77x (1976). The court proscribed knowing and deliberate conspiracy
to defraud investors.
38. 328 F.2d at 862-63.
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know the [falsity] of what he said or wrote may legitimately be drawn.' ,,39 In
this situation, the actor is reckless because he "deliberately closed his eyes to
facts he had a duty to see"'40 and is, therefore, deemed guilt) of conscious
deception.
4 1
Recklessness differs from negligence in several respects, although breach of
duty is implicit in both concepts. 42 Negligence is comprised of the actor's
failure to perceive a risk that the reasonable man "should have known" in
light of community standards. 43 Recklessness, however, involves the actor's
disregard of a risk that he "must have known" in light of the actual
circumstances. 4 4 This distinction was the focal issue in Ultrantares Corp. v.
Touche,45 a case involving accountants' liability for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. 46 The defendant accounting firm prepared financial state-
ments by relying on representations made by an employee of the audited
company and failed to verify independently the existence of assets later
39. Id. at 861-62 (quoting Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327. 329 (2d Cir), cert denied,
273 U.S. 713 (1926)).
40. 328 F.2d at 862. The court did not specifically refer to the defendant's conduct as
reckless. The Benjamin case has, however, been cited for the proposition that recklessness is a
form of knowing conduct. E.g., United States v. Brawer, 482 F.2d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 1973). SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1097 (2d Cir. 1972); Tarvestad v United States,
418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970).
41. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S.
389, 394-96 (1933); Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U S 713
(1926).
42. The distinction is often academic, but recklessness should also be compared with gross
negligence to define the scienter standard under rule l0b-5. The difference between negligence
and gross negligence is one of degree. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 20, § 16.1, at 896-902,
W. Prosser, supra note 20, § 34, at 183-84; see McTavish v. Chesapeake & 0. RR, 485 F.2d 510,
512 (6th Cir. 1973); Frankel v. Kurtz, 239 F. Supp. 713, 718 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Montellier v.
United States, 202 F. Supp. 384, 400 nn.9 & 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), afj'd, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1963). The difficulty in distinguishing gross negligence from recklessness arises when courts
attempt to determine the actor's mental state by focusing on the egregiousness of the result of the
conduct, rather than by examining the attendant circumstances of the conduct. The distinguish-
ing factor, therefore, is not what the actor should have done to comport with community
standards, but the actions that should have been taken in light of the attendant circumstances.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, Comment g at 590 (1977). A federal district court has
recently explained its perception of the difference between gross negligence and recklessness:
"[w]hereas the former implies an irrational failure to perceive a danger, the latter connotes
persisting in a course of action in the face of a perceived danger, although the specific harm
resulting may not be intended." Berman v. Richmond Indus., Inc., [1978 Transfer Binderl Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,518, at 94,015 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
43. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12 (rev. ed. 1965). "The words 'should know' are
used throughout the Restatement ... to denote ...that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the
performance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such
fact exists." Id.
44. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, Comment g at 590 (1977); see Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977).
45. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
46. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
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disclosed to be fictitious. 4 7 Judge Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of
Appeals, noted that "accountants . . . by the very nature of their calling
profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agreement between the
audit and the entries."'48 Accordingly, a defendant is merely negligent when
he has failed to conduct the necessary inquiries, yet prepares a financial
statement because he "believed the representation made by him to be true...
without reasonable cause for such belief."'49 In contrast, a defendant is
reckless if he failed to inquire even though he was "put on [his] guard by the
circumstances . . . to scrutinize with special care."'50 In such a case, "[a] jury
might find that with suspicions thus awakened, [he] closed [his] eyes to the
obvious, and blindly gave assent."' Thus, recklessness is more than the
omission of ordinary care; unlike a negligent act, a reckless act is performed in
such disregard of the deleterious consequences as to evince bad faith.3
2
The bad faith that distinguishes negligence from recklessness supports the
imposition of liability for defamation of public officials. The balance between
the public official's reputation and the publisher's first amendment rights
could not be maintained if publishers were held to the same negligence
standard of ordinary care that governs a reasonably prudent person in the
conduct of his daily activities. 53 Thus, a public official cannot recover
damages for libel unless the defamatory statement was published with actual
malice; that is, knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard for its
truth or falsity.5 4 In St. Amant v. Thompson,5 5 the Court held that a
47. Id. at 192, 174 N.E. at 443-44. The defendants used a random choice of accounts to
determine whether the books of the company were regular. The court found this system of
verification inadequate. The defendants admitted that none of the invoices supporting the
fictitious sales were selected for inspection or investigation. Although the court noted that
independent verification usually involves "the exercise of judgment and discretion," such is not
the case where the inquiry is "whether the entries certified as there, are there in very truth, there
in the form and in the places where men of business training would expect them to be." Id. at
192, 174 N.E. at 449.
48. Id. at 191, 174 N.E. at 449.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 192, 174 N.E. at 449.
51. Id. In State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938), the New York
Court of Appeals adopted the idea that recklessness involves a deliberate disregard of an obvious
risk. The court described recklessness on the part of accountants as "a . . . misstatement, or an
opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief in
its truth, . . . [a] refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful." Id. at 112, 15
N.E.2d at 418-19.
52. 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 20, § 7.3, at 537; see United States v. Amrep. Corp.,
560 F.2d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Whittle v. United States,
328 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929,
932-34 (D. Del. 1962).
53. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1979); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152-54 (1967); Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 170
(C.D. Cal. 1974), modified, 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978). The public interest in compensating
injured plaintiffs who are not public figures is greater because they have less opportunity for
rebuttal, and have not voluntarily cast themselves in the public light. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974).
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Accordingly, the Court held that
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publisher's failure to investigate the truth or falsity of a statement prior to its
publication is not in itself reckless.- 6 Rather, "[there must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of [its] publication. Publishing with such doubts
shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice."5 7 Admittedly, an analogy to the scienter requirement in defamation
cases is not dispositive of the issue under rule 10b-5. It does serve, however,
to illustrate that the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of using an
objective scienter standard, such as recklessness, as a substitute for subjective
or conscious fault.58
Similarly, a distinction between recklessness and negligence is used in
criminal law to determine the severity of a crime. s 9 For example, the Model
Penal Code converts homicide to manslaughter when a death is caused by the
defendant's recklessness. 60 The Code defines recklessness as a conscious
disregard of a risk "of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature
and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct [a person)
would observe in the actor's situation."'6 1 In comparison, an actor's conduct is
negligent when the actor "should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk ... of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it...
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor's situation." 62 The primary difference between the
two definitions is that while the reckless actor consciously disregards a risk
ascertainable from the actual circumstances, the negligent actor unconsciously
disregards a risk of which he should be aware in light of the community
the defendant newspaper did not act recklessly and hence, was not liable for defamation. even
though it failed to investigate the claims of an advertisement it had published. Id. at 287-88.
55. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
56. Id. at 730-33.
57. Id. at 731.
58. See id. at 731-32. The Court stated that a "Iflailure to investigate does not in itself
establish bad faith," id. at 733, yet, "[pirofessions of good faith will be unlikely to prove
persuasive. . . when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless
man would have put them in circulation. . . . [R]ecklessness may be found where there are
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the [statement]." Id. at 732 Thus, obviousness of harm
may substitute for guilty knowledge. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d
1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588. 595-96 (10th Cir.
1979); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978); Berdahl v
SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1978); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp.. 457 F Supp.
682, 711-12 (D.D.C. 1978).
59. See S. Kadish & M. Paulsen, supra note 23, at 97, 187-90; W La Fave & A Scott, supra
note 23, at 208.
60. Model Penal Code § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); accord, N-Y. Penal Law
§§ 125.10, 125.15 (McKinney 1975); Tex. Penal Code Ann. tit. .5, §§ 19.03. 19.07 Vernon 1974)-
Compare Model Penal Code § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (criminal homicide is
classified as manslaughter, a second degree felony, when it is committed recklessly) with Model
Penal Code § 210.4 (1974) (criminal homicide is classified as negligent homicide, a third degree
felony, when it is committed negligently).
61. Model Penal Code § 2.02(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
62. Id. at § 2.02(d).
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standards. Although both definitions take into consideration the reasonable-
ness of the conduct, the knowledge of actual circumstances is tantamount to
awareness of a danger, imputing a purposeful state of mind to the reckless
defendant; his disregard of the risk and indifference to the danger are deemed
deliberate, and, therefore, culpable. 63
In sum, in various contexts courts have been successful in making the
distinctions between recklessness and other mental states necessary to cir-
cumscribe the scope of liability and to determine the proportionality of
sanctions. The Supreme Court sought to achieve similar goals in Hochfelder
by mandating proof of scienter for rule 10b-5 liability. 64 Therefore, when
applying a recklessness standard in rule 10b-5 cases, the federal courts should
adopt a definition that encompasses culpable conduct, yet is capable of
objective proof.
II. RECKLESSNESS IN RULE 10b-5 ACTIONS
The inability of most courts to define the recklessness standard for rule
10b-5 actions is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's observation that "the
difficult problems presented [in securities litigation] have been in the formula-
tion of the governing principles of law rather than the more common legal
problem of application of settled principles .. .to particular facts." 65 Thus,
some courts avoid the issue by deftly stating that it is unnecessary to
define precisely the nature of reckless behavior. 66  Other courts use
definitions that require evidence that the defendant actually knew of the
danger of misleading plaintiffs, and thus pose the obstacle of subjective
proof. 67 In addition, some definitions of recklessness are broad enough to
63. The Comments to the Model Penal Code state that "negligence [is] distinguished from
acting purposely, knowingly or recklessly in that it does not involve a state of awareness." Model
Penal Code § 2.02(3), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
64. See notes 1-19 supra and accompanying text.
65. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 n. 15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977); accord, Stern v. American Bankshare5 Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 826 (E.D.
Wis. 1977).
66. E.g., Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 830 (1978). The Third Circuit stated that in private damage actions " 'a party must prove
injury resulting ... from a misrepresentation so recklessly made that the culpability attaching to
such reckless conduct closely approaches that which attaches to conscious deception.' " 567 F.2d
at 574. This formulation is completely circular in reasoning, see Trimming of the Section 10(b)
Tree, supra note 9, at 126, because some mental culpability must be present in order to determine
the degree of scienter. See also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 889 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (refused to use Coleco definition for jury instruction). Another court stated that it found "no
reason to indulge in semantic definitional games, for in this case it is clear that under any sensible
standard of scienter [the defendant] cannot be held liable." Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 457 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); accord, Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647 n.6
(8th Cir. 1978) (defendant's conduct "sufficiently purposive").
67. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 37 (2d
Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 584 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993
(1976); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1974); notes 94-105 itfra
and accompanying text.
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encompass negligence.68 Finally, even when an accurate definition is adopted,
some courts fail to apply it properly.
69
A. The Franke Definition
Perhaps in recognition of the "variety, disparity and confusion" of judicial
definitions of the "requisite but elusive mental element" 70 in rule lob-5
actions, the federal district court in Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Devel-
opment Authority, 71 set forth an explicit definition of recklessness which is
sufficiently narrow to exclude liability for negligence and which may be
satisfied by objective proof. In Franke, an investor in industrial revenue
bonds sued the bond counsel alleging that counsel recklessly omitted com-
munication of material facts and misrepresented the financial worth of the
bond offering. 72 In the context of these facts, the court stated:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it. 7 3
The court held that the defendants were not liable because they "possessed
neither authority nor responsibility ... to participate in either the formulation
or the review of . .. official [financial] statement[s]. '74 Under such circum-
68. See, e.g., SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 649 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); Upton v. Trinidad
Petro. Corp., 468 F. Supp. 330, 337 (N.D. Ala. 1979); Stern v, American Bankshares Corp.. 429
F. Supp. 818, 827 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Whitaker & Rotch, supra note 1. at 372; notes 114-23 infra
and accompanying text.
69. See Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516-17 (1st Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coven,
581 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 3S, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Arthur Young &
Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (19771;
Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 536-57 (D. Md.
1978). The basis for a majority of these decisions appears to be no more than a judicial recognition
that reckless conduct is more than negligent, but less than intentional. See, e.g., Edward J.
Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1979); Cook v- Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685,
692 (1st Cir. 1978); Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1978); Upton v. Trinidad Petro.
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 330, 337 (N.D. Ala. 1979). See generally Jacobs, supra note 8, at 474-76;
Metzger & Heintz, supra note 3, at 90-112.
70. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
71. 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
72. Id. at 722.
73. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 724. The defendants' involvement in the transaction was limited to the preparation
of an opinion concerning the legality of the bond sale and the verification of the tax exempt status
of the interest payments accruing to the bond-holders. Id. at 722. The court noted that if
"obviousness of risk of harm can be a substitute for guilty knowledge, it is sufficient to note that
there is no evidence here of such a state of facts." Id. at 725. The court stated that "it would be
inappropriate... to arbitrarily expand bond counsel liability beyond expressly understood limits
and clearly beyond [the defendants'] acknowledged and professed area of expertise." Id. at 722.
This is particularly valid in aiding and abetting cases. "Since many large securities transactions
require the mechanical aid of a number of collateral participants" the proper scienter standard
becomes the determinative factor in differentiating between those fraudulently involved and those
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stances, the function of the bond counsel was not "to warrant the over-all
economic soundness of the issue. '""5 Not only was there a lack of evidence that
the defendants had actual knowledge, 76 but the extent of their professional
duty and the scope of their particular obligations did not place them in
circumstances which must have informed them of the risk to the plaintiffs.
77
Accordingly, the defendants' failure to disclose certain adverse facts relating
to the capitalization of the bond offering was not an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care, and thus, the defendants were not reckless. 78
In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,7 9 the Seventh Circuit adopted
the Franke definition and provided a practical mode of analysis for courts
applying a recklessness standard. The plaintiff in Sunstrand had been in-
volved in negotiating a merger with Standard Kollsman Industries (SKI).
Although the merger was never consummated, the plaintiff purchased a
substantial amount of stock in reliance upon representations made by the
defendant, a SKI director and merger broker, concerning the financial per-
formance and condition of SKI.80 Specifically, the defendant had given the
plaintiff an earnings projection based partially on an accounting policy that
deferred reporting preproduction costs. This projection yielded a higher
earnings potential than would have been revealed had preproduction costs
been included.8 '
The Sundstrand court developed a two-pronged analysis using the Franke
definition of recklessness as a base. First, the court employed an objective test
requiring that "the danger of misleading buyers must be . . . so obvious that
any reasonable man would be legally bound as knowing. '8 2 The court then
used a subjective component requiring that "the danger of misleading buyers
must be actually known . .. and the omission must derive from something
"who were guilty only of engaging in the usual and customary business activities." Cumis Ins.
Soc'y, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 457 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see Note, Rule
lob-5: Liability for Aiding and Abetting after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. Fla. L. Rev.
999 (1976).
75. 428 F. Supp. at 722.
76. Id. at 724-25.
77. Id. at 725.
78. Id.
79. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). The Franke definition "will
not significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon experts who
perform services or express opinions with regard to matters under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." Id. at 1045 n.21. (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 1037. The merger between the two companies was cancelled because of
certain aspects of SKI's operation, such as increased labor costs, unfavorable labor practices, the
unexpected incompatibility of the two companies' producLs, and an overly optimistic earnings
projection. Id. at 1038. The plaintiff had previously purchased shares of SKI stock in anticipation
of the merger and suffered financial loss due to its cancellation. Id. at 1037.
81. Id. at 1038-39.
82. Id. at 1045. (footnote omitted) This component of the Sundstrand analysis obviates any
inclusion of negligence in the recklessness standard. The knowledge is imputed from circum-
stances that must have been evident to the actor. Hence, the "grey area in which negligence
merges into recklessness," Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516-17 (1st Cir. 1978)
(footnote omitted), is clearly delineated into black and white. The standard is objective because of
the importance of the actual circumstances at the time of the transaction.
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more egregious than even 'white heart/empty head' good faith."8 3 Further-
more, the court stated that even if the subjective test is not satisfied by
evidence that the defendant disregarded "actual knowledge," liability for
recklessness can be based on proof of "constructive knowledge," or support of
the objective component only.8 4 Applying this analysis to the factual circum-
stances, the court found that the defendant was reckless as a matter of law
and therefore liable under rule lOb-5s.8
Under the objective test, the court considered several circumstances sur-
rounding the defendant's conduct relevant to the obviousness of the potential
fraud. First, the defendant's role as both a director and merger broker
situated him" 'on both sides and in the middle of the transaction.' "86 Second,
another director, officer, and large shareholder of SKI had submitted a formal
inquiry to SKI's board of directors concerning the impropriety of deferring the
accounting of preproduction costs. Third, a major public accounting firm
concluded that this accounting practice seemed questionable, and the firm's
report was discussed at numerous board meetings at which the defendant was
present.87 Finally, the accounting policy caused shareholders to lodge a
formal complaint with the SEC and prompted two SKI directors to refuse to
sign an SEC registration statement.8 8
Given these attendant circumstances, the Sundstrand court concluded that
the obviousness of the risk of misleading the plaintiffs was sufficient to infer
that the defendant must have known of the potential harm.8 9 "When mea-
sured against this external standard, it may be said that . . . a reckless man
has 'use[d] or employ[ed] [a] deceptive device' " in contravention of rule
lob-5.90
Under the subjective test, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendant
actually appreciated the significance of the omitted material. 9' The court
based this finding on the defendant's negative response when specifically
asked whether the plaintiff had been informed of the faulty accounting
practices. 92 The defendant did not "genuinely forg[e]t about these facts...
83. 553 F.2d at 1045. Under this aspect of the Sundstrand analysis. the actual appreciation
by the defendant of the significance of the alleged omission or misrepresentation is considered,
Even "inexcusable negligence" would not be included under this test. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 n.5 (1976). To illustrate this aspect of the definition, the
Sundstrand court hypothesized a defendant who genuinely forgot to disclose information. This
actor would not be liable "even though the proverbial 'reasonable man' would never have
forgotten." 553 F.2d at 1045 n.20. See also SEC v. National Student Mktg., Corp., 457 F_ Supp.
682, 711-12 n.68 (D.D.C. 1978).
84. 553 F.2d at 1047. The Sundstrand case illustrates that although the Franke definition
may not be "the conceptual equivalent of intent as a matter of general philosophy, it does serve as
a proper legally functional equivalent for intent, because it measures conduct against --- an
external standard." Id. at 1045.
85. Id. at 1048.
86. Id. at 1043.
87. Id. at 1046.
88. Id. at 1047.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1045.
91. Id. at 1046.
92. Id. at 1047.
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[b]ut consciously decided not to disclose" the danger of the accounting practices
to the plaintiff. 93 Therefore, the defendant was reckless under either the
objective or subjective test, and hence, could not escape liability under rule
lOb-5.
B. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit Application
There are several benefits of the Seventh Circuit's application of the Franke
definition of recklessness. First, the plaintiff need not necessarily prove that
the defendant had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. Second, even if a
plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant had subjective knowledge, objective
evidence of the circumstances existing at the time of the defendant's conduct
may impute constructive knowledge of the risk of harm. Third, consideration
of the obviousness of the actual circumstances to support an inference that the
defendant "must have known" of the risk, provides a distinction from
negligence because a defendant will not be held liable solely because he
"should have known" of the risk. Finally, the Seventh Circuit's application of
the Franke definition provides a framework for practical analysis of the
complex factors inherent in securities litigation.
First, the Seventh Circuit's use of a subjective test as an alternative basis
on which to find recklessness has certain merits. Certainly, if there is
unequivocal evidence, by an admission, for example, that the defendant knew
he was fraudulently misleading the plaintiff, the inquiry into the defendant's
scienter is ended;9 ' the Hochfelder requirement of conscious deception would
be satisfied. 95 If such subjective proof is not accessible to the plaintiff,
however, a court applying the Seventh Circuit approach, could still use the
objective standard. 96 Failure to do so may not only preclude many injured
plaintiffs from properly recovering, 97 but may result in the court's use of
attenuated reasoning to support a defendant's mental culpability. 98 For
93. Id. (citation omitted).
94. See McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Herzfeld v, Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Transocean Tender Offer
Sec. Lit., 455 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Aldrich v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 446
F. Supp. 348, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
95. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-98 (1976).
96. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1C33, 1046 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977); see notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978). Section 10(b) was enacted, in part, due to the inadequate redress available to
investors under state law. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). There were many
state "blue sky" laws that had provisions regulating fraud prior to the enactment of the federal
securities acts. These state laws were characterized as "hastily drafted by well-intentioned men
with little or no appreciation of the world of finance. . . . iFlew of the statutory schemes were
sufficiently sophisticated to achieve the avowed purpose of preventing fraud." L. Loss & E.
Cowett, Blue Sky Law 11 (1958). See generally 3 L. Loss, upra note 25, at 1623-83; Note, The
Future of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5: A Proposal, 9
Cum. L. Rev. 721, 724 (1979).
98. One commentator has observed that the courts "have feigned consistent standards while
broadly deciding each case on its individual facts depending on the result they believe is dictated
by their own particular construction of the purposes of Section 10(b)." Mann, Rule lob-5:
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example, in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,99 the
Second Circuit recognized the elements of recklessness,100 but sought to
predicate the defendant's liability on actual awareness that he had fraudu-
lently misled the plaintiff. 10 The plaintiff, however, did not demonstrate that
the defendant actually knew that audits he had prepared falsely would be
used for a final financial statement upon which the plaintiff would rely in
making securities investments.10 2 Moreover, the plaintiff did not allege that
the defendant had participated in or had responsibility for the final report. 1
0 3
Nevertheless, by considering the materiality of the omissions and misrepresen-
tations, and the plaintiff's reliance, the court found that the defendant
possessed the requisite "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."', This
reasoning improperly blurs the distinctions between the separate elements of
the rule 10b-5 offense.' 05
Lacking the necessary evidence to satisfy the subjective test, the Herzfeld
court might have used an objective standard to determine the presence of
recklessness. 106 Under that second test, Sunstrand directs a court to examine
the actual circumstances existing at the time of the transaction, rather than
attempt to discern the defendant's state of mind "in the blazing light of
hindsight."' 0 7 The Third Circuit recently employed this approach in McLean
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter,
45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1206, 1207 (1970). See also Keeton, supra note 26, at 583.
99. 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). The defendant Laventhol prepared financial statements that
were used in formulating a report to advise the plaintiff of the profitability of a corporation in
which the plaintiff was planning to invest. Laventhol used an accounting method that im-
mediately recognized profits from a "fictitious or proposed or artificial transaction." id. at 30
(citations omitted), that, had it been consummated, would have been the largest transaction in the
corporation's history. Id. The plaintiffs relied on the financial report and suffered financial loss.
Id. at 34.
100. Id. at 35-36. Although the Herzfeld court did not expressly use the term, the decision has
been cited for the proposition that recklessness sustains a private action under rule lob-5. See,
e.g., Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439 U.S
830 (1978); Aldrich v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 348, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)_
The Herzfeld court noted that the defendant acted in total disregard of facts which were known to
him and "dictated precisely the contrary course." 540 F.2d at 35.
101. 540 F.2d at 32-34.
102. Id. at 32.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 37. For example, the court acknowledged that the defendants were "not being cast
in damages for negligen[ce]," but for "their active participation in the preparation and issuance of
false and materially misleading accounting reports upon which (the plaintiff] relied to his
damage." Id. Yet, the court did not delineate the relationship between scienter and materiality or
reliance, and never expressly described the nature of the defendant's scienter.
105. 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 17, at 193-223; 5 A. Jacobs, supra note 3,
§ 36, at 2-2 to 2-6; Note, The Future of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC
Rule 10b-5: A Proposal, 9 Cum. L. Rev. 721, 721 (1979). See generally Note, The Due Diligence
Defense in Rule lOb-5: The Hochfelder Aftershocks, 11 Ind. L. Rev. 727, 730-33 (1978); see also
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 63 (1975).
106. Concededly, the court's finding of liability was justified given the egregious conduct of
the defendant. See 540 F.2d at 36.
107. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.19 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). "As in all lawsuits, we deal in the sometimes unreal certainties of
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v. Alexander, 108 in which the plaintiff purchased stock in reliance on rep-
resentations in the defendant public accounting firm's report that was based
on an audit which erroneously included unconsummated consignment sales in
current assets.' 0 9 The court found no evidence that the defendant, a partner
in the firm, had "actual knowledge of the consignment arrangement" or that
he "was aware of the risk" that the financial statements were misleading. I10
But applying the Sundstrand objective standard, the court stated that the
accountant could be held to have the necessary scienter if the evidence "give[s]
rise to an inference that it 'must have been aware' of the risk that the
[statement] was misleading."' Holding that the defendant was not reckless,
the court determined that he was not privy to the purchasing negotiations,
that he would not have been put on notice of the consignment nature of the
sales by inconsistencies in the audit, and that he received confirmations
indicating that several accounts receivable were genuine."12 The court con-
cluded that although the defendant had reason to believe that the investiga-
tion into the sales was inadequate, 113 there was no evidence to support
hindsight. . . .[The defendant] may think he 'knows' things contrary to what he is told by the
management upon which he must perforce rely. He may be wrong. . . .How and when he
must-or may-run off to 'warn' or advise outsiders . . . could suggest questions of great
refinement." Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH I I
92,826, at 90,105 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
108. 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
109. Id. at 1194-96. The plaintiff, a sophisticated investor, sought to invest in a company
with a good future growth potential. Id. at 1195. The plaintiff chose to purchase stock in
Technidyne based on his own knowledge of the company's future sales potential and the report of
the defendants-a public accounting firm-which indicated that Technidyne had "hard" sales
consummated of the Model V Techitool. Id. at 1195-96. These sales were, in fact, not
consummated and the plaintiff, therefore, suffered a loss as a result of his investment. Id. at
1196.
110. Id. at 1199.
111. Id. The McLean court extended the use of the Seventh Circuit's definition of recklessness
to misrepresentations as well as omissions. Id. at 1197; accord, Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Franke v.
Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
112. 599 F.2d at 1199. The defendants relied on certain telegram messages wlhich confirmed
purchase orders, but did not indicate confirmation of amounts due and owing. These telegrams
had been fraudulently sent by employees of Technidyne, rather than the customers. McLean v.
Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1070 (D. Del. 1976), rev'd, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). The
accountants never personally verified the telegrams, and therefore, did not discover the fraud.
599 F.2d at 1199. "Thus, without having received positive confirmations from three of four
accounts representing nearly 90% of the dealer receivables and having no personal knowledge
about any of the dealers since they were all new accounts, [the defendant] issued a certified audit
indicating that the accounts were genuine." 420 F. Supp. at 1070. Additionally, there was a one
month discrepancy between the invoices of the sales and the purported purchase orders. This
discrepancy, coupled with the fact that some of the merchandise was still in the Technidyne
warehouse, might have put the defendants on notice of a possible fraud. Id. at 1199.
113. Id. at 1199-1200. The court noted that if it applied a negligence standard it "could affirm
a finding that given the one month discrepancy in the due dates between the invoice and purchase
order, the late issuance of the invoice, and the ambiguity in the telegraphic confirmation [of
accounts receivable], [the accountant] should have made further inquiry of management .. .
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liability for recklessness. The court's analysis suggests that insufficiency of
subjective evidence should not foreclose further inquiry into the objective
circumstances of the defendant's conduct to discover the potential for reck-
lessness.
The third benefit of the Seventh Circuit analysis is that knowledge is
imputed because of the obviousness of the attendant circumstances: thus, a
defendant is reckless only if he "must have known" of the risk, and is not
liable when he is merely negligent because he "should have known" of the
risk. 114 The Second Circuit failed to draw this distinction in Roif v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 11s in which it purported to use the Franke definition,
but did not employ the Seventh Circuit's analytical framework. "16 In Rolf, the
plaintiff had entrusted his stock portfolio to the defendant broker who had
delegated management of the portfolio to another investment advisor who the
court characterized as "one of the 'new breed' of young money-managers with
supposed expertise in research and 'special situations.' ",117 The defendant
made repeated assurances concerning the advisor's capabilities to manage the
account profitably, when in fact, the court found that the defendant consid-
ered some of the investments made for plaintiff to be "junk"-or securities of
very low quality. 1 8 The court held that the defendant was reckless because
he had failed to investigate the stock purchases and to supervise the invest-
ment decisions adequately, yet represented to the plaintiff the soundness of his
before concluding that the account receivable was genuine." Id. Furthermore, the court recog-
nized that those factors did not evidence that the accountant "was aware that it was without
sufficient knowledge to form that opinion. Such a holding would obliterate the distinction
between tortious conduct requiring scienter. which the Hochfelder construction of § 1olbi
demands, and negligence, which Hochfelder found insufficient." Id. at 1200
114. See notes 42-63 supra and accompanying text.
115. 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) Similarly. in Lanza v Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), the Second Circuit formulated a recklessness
standard which encompassed whether "the defendants knew the material facts misstated or
omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure.
to apprise themselves of the facts where they could have done so without any extraordinary
effort." Id. at 1306 n.98. This standard amounts to little more than a description of the skeletal
fact situation that would normally give rise to a lob-5 suit. The difficult issue concerning the
defendant's duty of inquiry and the facts that would give notice are merely stated without more
Thus, knowledge may be imputed to the defendant by determining what he "should have known"
based on the reasonable community standard. Such a result would include negligence within the
scope of rule 10b-5 liability. Substantially similar formulations have been used both before and
after the Hochfelder decision. See, e.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332. 1137-38 t9th Cirj,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Cohen v. Franchard Corp.. 478 F 2d 115. 123 (2d Cir ), tert
denied, 414 U.S. 357 (1973); Steinberg v. Carey. 439 F. Supp. 1233. 1239 (S.D N Y 1977); Little
v. First Cal. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) r 96.225, at 92.555 (D
Ariz. 1977).
116. 570 F.2d at 45-47.
117. Id. at 41-42. The plaintiff sought to combine the investment advisor's "youth and zeal
with [the defendant's] reliability and supervision." Id. at 42.
118. Id. at 43. The plaintiff's portfolio included 21 good quality listed securities and the
warrants of two companies, and had an estimated value of $1,423,000 at the time the defendant
assumed responsibility. Id. at 42. Shortly before the plaintiff brought suit, its value had dropped
to S446,000.
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portfolio. 119 Judge Mansfield dissented arguing that the plaintiffs allegations
supported only a finding that the defendant failed to conduct an investigation
necessary to make these assertions, and that the danger to the plaintiff was
neither known to the defendant nor would it "have been readily apparent
upon exercise of due diligence."' 20
After Hochfelder, "[a] failure to perform such an investigation without more
does not ... establish" that the defendant "deliberately shu[t] his eyes to facts
that would have revealed the 'fraud.' ",121 It is arguable, therefore, that the
Rolf court improperly imposed liability for recklessness without finding that
the defendant had either subjective or constructive knowledge of fraud.
Liability seems to have been based solely on breach of the duty of inquiry
22
pursuant to which the defendant "should have known" of the risk to the
plaintiff. 123 Thus, the Second Circuit's decision in Rolf complies neither with
the Seventh Circuit's analysis of recklessness nor with the scienter require-
ment of Hochfelder.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the Franke definition of recklessness
provides functional guidelines for courts to apply to determine the scienter of
119. Id. at 47-48, citing State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 1 N.E.2d 416,
418-19 (1938); see note 51 supra. The Rolf court determined that the defendant was liable as an
aider and abettor because of his continual assurances concdrning the advisor's fraudulent
mismanagement of the account, 570 F.2d at 44, stating that the Hocifelder scienter requirement
applies to aiding and abetting liability. Id. The Roif decision has been subsequently cited to
support the proposition that the recklessness standard is limited to fiduciary relationships in
aiding and abetting cases. See Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d
478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979); Bartels v. Algonquin Props. Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1132, 1147 (D. Vt. 1979);
Schulman v. Weil, 466 F. Supp. 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 457 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
120. 570 F.2d at 50 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield pointed out that "at all
pertinent times [the investment advisor's] reputation . . . was excellent and his successful
accomplishments in the trade were well known." Id. Indeed, the plaintiff testified "that he
'wanted somebody other than [the defendantr to handle his account. In short, he wanted to
gamble on some 'high fliers.' " Id. at 53 (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 52 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 47. "The standard of care applicable to the determination of whether an
independent accountant has exercised due care in his conduct . . . is similar to the standard
applied to doctors, lawyers and other professional experts, in that their conduct is not measured
in terms of the customary 'reasonable man' test of negligence but rather in terms of a 'reasonable
CPA' test." Solomon, supra note 12, at 57-58; see Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72
N.W.2d 364 (1955); Rassieur v. Charles, 354 Mo. 117, 188 S.W.2d 817 (1945).
123. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 192 (1976). Hochfelder involved an
accounting firm that had failed to investigate a corporation president's "mail rule" under which
only he could open mail addressed to him. This practice aided him in embezzling investors' funds.
The failure to fulfill a duty of inquiry, even if mandated by a fiduciary position, cannot alone
support an action under rule 10b-5. Id. Furthermore, to impose such liability on a broker who is
essentially little more than a supervisor of an account disregards an established market practice
under which "thousands of business ventures" are traded in the United States markets and it
would be "impossible for any one investment advisor . . . to follow all traded business ventures
closely." Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S
1039 (1978) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
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securities personnel in private 10b-5 actions. In contrast to the somewhat
amorphous and contradictory scienter standards developed to construe
Hochfelder, the Seventh Circuit's analysis strikes an equitable balance be-
tween the goals of protecting investors and insuring the efficient functioning of
the securities market. It is submitted that the federal courts should uniformly
adopt and apply the Seventh Circuit's analysis to achieve the just resolution of
private damage actions under rule 10b-5.
Jeanne P. Bolger
